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1 Introduction
It is widely documented that wages are higher in larger cities. In the 2000 census, average
hourly wages of white prime-age men working full-time and full-year were 32 percent higher
in metropolitan areas (MSAs) of over 1.5 million people than in rural areas. Table 1
presents estimates of city size wage premia using census data from 1980, 1990 and 2000.
It shows regressions of the log hourly wage for full-time full-year white men on indicators
for living in medium and large population MSAs. The excluded category includes small
MSAs and rural areas. Results in Specification 1 show that the city size wage premium is
monotonic and has been increasing over time. Indeed, the relationship between wages and
population is monotonically increasing by about 1 percentage point for each additional 100
thousand in population over the full range of MSA size. Specification 2 shows that in each
year about one-third of the two estimated size premia can be explained with observable
measures of skill and labor market experience. In addition, the city size wage gap has
become considerably steeper since 1980 when large MSAs had wages that were 24 percent
greater than rural areas. Because firm productivity is closely related to wages, this is
evidence that firms in larger cities are more productive.
In this paper, we investigate the causes of the city size wage and productivity gaps.
Our analysis utilizes a model of on-the-job search that incorporates endogenous migration
between small, medium and large cities. Estimated parameters from the model allow
for a decomposition of the observed city size wage gap into four components that all
potentially interact: 1) sorting on unobserved ability across cities, 2) diﬀerences in search
frictions, unemployment benefits and the distributions of the firm-worker match component
of wages across cities and abilities, 3) variation in wage level eﬀects across cities and abilities
and 4) variation in returns to experience across cities and abilities. Our use of a finite
mixture model as in Keane & Wolpin (1997) allows for recovery of parameters indexed
by unobserved ability. As in Pavan (2009), our employment of a non-Gaussian state
space approach to construct the likelihood function allows for inclusion of the unobserved
firm-worker match component of the wage process in the model.
Counterfactual simulations of the estimated structural model indicate that variation
in wage intercepts and returns to experience across location type are the most important
components of the overall city size wage premium. For college graduates, each of these
channels accounts for roughly half of the wage premia of medium and large cities over
small cities and rural areas, though returns to experience are somewhat more important
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in the largest cities. For high school graduates these same two channels together also
account for the entire wage premia studied. However, level eﬀects are almost three times as
important as diﬀerences in returns to experience across location type for the wage premium
of medium sized cities over small cities and rural areas, while each channel generates roughly
equal portions of the large-small city wage premium. Our results provide no evidence
that diﬀerences in labor market search frictions or firm-worker match quality contribute
appreciably to city size wage premia.1
While we confirm evidence from elsewhere of positive sorting on observed skill to larger
cities, our results indicate that sorting on unobserved ability within education group con-
tributes little to observed city size wage premia. In fact, if anything we find evidence of
mild negative sorting on unobserved ability. Among college graduates, high latent ability
men are slightly less likely than low ability men to enter the labor force in large cities
and they tend to move away from large cities at a faster rate than low ability men over
the life-cycle. Among high school graduates, high ability types are less likely to enter
the labor force in medium sized cities than small cities. This evidence of mild negative
sorting on latent ability into larger cities manifests itself as even greater wage premia for
medium and large cities over small cities and rural areas than those observed in the data in
a counterfactual environment with no migration and equalized ability distributions across
locations.
While results in this paper do not provide a complete taxonomy of all of the mechanisms
by which workers in larger cities are more productive, as no single study could, they
highlight the relative importance of various classes of explanations for understanding this
fact. In particular, our results are consistent with larger cities fostering greater rates of
human capital accumulation on the job, or "learning", especially for more highly skilled
workers. The importance of level eﬀects in the wage process for generating wage premia
of interest could be generated by a host of underlying mechanisms, many of which are
discussed in Duranton & Puga (2004). Potential mechanisms include sharing of inputs
produced at large eﬃcient scales, sharing risk and taking advantage of greater opportunities
for division of labor. Empirical evaluations of micro-founded theories of how larger cities
foster more rapid worker learning and sharing can diﬀer by city size we leave to future
1Standard urban models typically imply that both the density and level of MSA population may generate
agglomeration economies. We follow the convention of most studies of the urban wage premium and use
population as our primary agglomeration measure. Ciccone & Hall (1996) is an important study of
agglomeration economies that instead uses a density measure. Since MSA population and density are
strongly positively correlated, the choice of measure matters little for our purposes.
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research. Investigation of why the relative importance of these two forces diﬀer by worker
skill would complement such eﬀorts.
Our results indicating a lack of importance of search frictions for generating city size
wage productivity premia are of particular interest. Petrongolo & Pissarides (2006) dis-
cuss numerous studies finding that the aggregate matching function is constant returns to
scale and they themselves find no evidence of higher job oﬀer arrival rates for the unem-
ployed in larger British labor markets. However, the existing literature neither examines
the possibility that the distributions of latent firm-worker match components of productiv-
ity may be diﬀerent across labor markets nor allows variation in job oﬀer arrival rates to
empirically compete with alternative explanations for higher wages in larger cities. Fur-
thermore, existing evidence that wage growth is more rapid in larger cities after accounting
for sorting, in Glaeser & Mare (2001) and Gould (2007) for example, does not distinguish
whether this pattern is generated by ascension of steeper job ladders or more rapid human
capital accumulation. We also provide new evidence on the nature of sorting on latent
ability conditional on observable components of skill and how this sorting contributes to
wage premia.2
Our results on the importance of diﬀerences in returns to experience for generating
city size wage premia are consistent with evidence from the existing literature, including
Glaeser & Maré (2001) and Gould (2007). However, this is the first study to fully measure
the extent to which city size wage premia are generated by diﬀerences in wage levels
independent of experience and search and matching eﬀects. Such level eﬀects are diﬃcult
to determine from panel data on workers because they are only observed when wages
change with migration across cities of diﬀerent sizes, and then only partially. When such
examples of migration occur, observed wage changes conflate migration frictions, cost of
living and option value diﬀerences across locations with diﬀerences in wage level eﬀects.
Our structural model and careful accounting for cost of living allow us to separately identify
each of these components. This cost of living adjustment is crucial. Indeed, our use of
three city size categories rather than two, as are used in many other studies, is motivated
by the observation that many elements of a model that rationalizes the persistence of a
city size productivity premium are not monotonic in city size, including wages adjusted
2Gould (2007) finds positive sorting on unobserved skill but estimates his model with only three latent
ability levels using a sample that includes both high school and college graduates. His finding that higher
latent ability men are more likely to live in larger cities is therefore fully explained by positive sorting on
observed education level and says little about sorting on latent ability conditional on education level.
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for cost of living. Our results on the role of level eﬀects in city size wage premia are
consistent with considerable recent empirical evidence finding positive local spillovers in
particular industries, including Rosenthal & Strange (2003), Arzhagi & Henderson (2008)
and Greenstone, Hornbeck & Moretti (2009) among others. The key innovation of this
paper over the existing literature is that we translate empirical estimates identified oﬀ of the
structure of the worker’s life-cycle problem back to complete and unified decompositions
of implied productivity diﬀerences across cities of diﬀerent sizes.
We should emphasize that the model specified in this paper is partial equilibrium in
nature. That is, firm location is taken as given. Part of the city size productivity gap may
come from selection of more productive firms into larger cities. Ellison & Glaeser (1997)
document that firms systematically locate in ways that generate industrial agglomerations,
though Combes et al. (2009) argue that once accounting for agglomeration forces, firm
productivity distributions exhibit no statistically significant truncation in larger cities as
would be predicted by a firm selection model across markets like Syverson’s (2004). Nev-
ertheless, to the extent that some industries are more productive than others, the pattern
documented by Ellison & Glaeser (1997) implies that more productive firms may also sys-
tematically locate in larger cities. While the framework developed in this paper has little
to say about the process that might generate such firm selection, it still allows us to learn
much about why larger cities are more productive. If input costs are higher in cities, it
would be diﬃcult for a general equilibrium model to justify the selective location of pro-
ductive firms producing traded goods to larger cities without their workers also being more
productive. Therefore, understanding why workers earn more in larger cities is informative
about why firms in larger cities are more productive.3
The next section provides a baseline theoretical framework and presents descriptive
evidence that is consistent with the results of the structural estimation exercise. Section
3 discusses data construction. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 discusses how we
estimate the model. Section 6 presents the estimation results and decompositions of the
city size wage gap using counterfactual simulations. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
3 It is also possible that firms are more productive in larger cities because these cities feature natural
advantages. However, Ellison & Glaeser (1999) provide evidence that natural advantage is not an important
source of agglomeration economies.
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2 Empirical Observations
The city size wage premium shows up pervasively in the data. Although we need to
appeal to the full structural model to fully understand the relative importance of various
channels for generating this premium, in this section we present descriptive evidence that
point to the most relevant mechanisms. In particular, we document patterns of transitions
between jobs and through unemployment as functions of city size and examine the extent
of selective migration. We then examine patterns of wage growth within jobs and over
diﬀerent types of labor market transitions as functions of city size. Putting these quantity
and price components together, we perform a statistical decomposition of wage growth
over the first 15 years of work experience as a function of city size. The key result of
this decomposition is that within job wage growth is the only component of total wage
growth that is monotonically increasing in city size on a positive base. While wage growth
between jobs is an important component of total wage growth, it has no clear relationship
with city size. This evidence is consistent with the estimated model simulation results
reported in Section 6 demonstrating that labor market search frictions and matching are
not important forces generating the city size wage premium.
A natural starting point for interpreting city size wage premia and conceptualizing how
they can persist is the class of models going back to Roback (1982) and Rosen (1979) that
emphasize compensating diﬀerentials across locations for firms and workers. A general
formulation has mobile firms with a constant returns to scale technology whose indirect
profit, given by Equation (1), is equalized across locations in long-run equilibrium. In this
formulation, labor , capital  and a composite non-traded good  all enter as factors of
production with input prices  ,  and  respectively. Locations are indexed by  and 
represents a local productive amenity that incorporates agglomeration forces.
 = max { ()− −  − } (1)
Assuming that the rental rate of capital is the same in every location, total diﬀerentiation
derives the following equilibrium relationship between any two locations  and 0, where 
is firms’ expenditure share on labor and  is firms’ expenditure share on the non-traded
good.
ln()− ln(0) = ln()− ln(0) −

 [ln()− ln(0)] (2)
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In the simplest one-factor environment, the city size log wage gap for identical workers thus
measures the log firm total factor productivity gap. If capital is an additional factor, the
log wage gap overstates the productivity gap by 1 . However, if the non-traded good is an
additional factor instead, the log wage gap understates total factor productivity diﬀerences
because local prices are positively correlated with wages.4
Table 2 reports city size wage premia in the NLSY data with and without adjustment
for cost of living diﬀerences across locations. The left side of Table 2 Panel A shows that
estimates of city size nominal wage premia using data from the NLSY are very similar to
those from the 1990 and 2000 censuses reported in Table 1. The estimated wage premium
for medium sized cities is 20 percent while that for large cities is 30 percent, indicating
that even though it only includes young adults in 1979, the NLSY is a reasonable data
set with which to evaluate reasons for the city size wage gap. Controlling for education
and quadratics in age and work experience reduces these coeﬃcients to 0.15 and 0.23
respectively. Controlling for individual fixed eﬀects additionally reduces these coeﬃcients
to 0.08 and 0.14.
That the inclusion of individual fixed eﬀects generates reductions in the urban-rural
wage gradient, though not the gradient between medium and large cities, may indicate
at first glance that positive sorting on unobserved skill is an important component of the
urban-rural wage premium. However, the fixed eﬀects results should be interpreted with
caution given that they are consistent only if mobility is random conditional on the fixed
eﬀect. This assumption would be violated if, for example, a worker moves to a diﬀerent
city because he receives an attractive wage oﬀer there, as would be predicted by our model
in Section 4. In general, the fixed eﬀect estimator provides inconsistent estimates if a
worker’s decision is influenced by a factor that is not perfectly persistent over time and is
correlated with wages. Additionally, the fixed eﬀect estimator is unlikely to be identified
from a representative sample. Therefore, it would not recover the mean city size wage
eﬀect in an environment with heterogeneous eﬀects of city size. Indeed, a simple Roy
(1951) model, as developed by Borjas (1987) for example, predicts that movers diﬀer on
unobservables from the overall population.
The right side of Table 2 Panel A presents analogous regression results when wages are
4 In his calibration of a similar model, Albouy (2009) uses  = 0825 and  = 0025 based on estimates
in the literature, implying that the nominal city size wage gap overstates firm productivity diﬀerences by
something on the order of 15 percent.
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adjusted for cost of living diﬀerences across metropolitan areas.5 These estimates reflect
the fact that cost of living in large metropolitan areas is much higher than that in smaller
places. In all three of the reported specifications, real wages in medium sized metropolitan
areas are the highest. This inverse U profile of wages adjusted for cost of living exists at
most levels of experience, evidence that the cost of living adjustment primarily influences
measured wage levels rather than measured wage growth.6
Table 2 Panels B and C repeat the same analysis using subsamples of college graduates
and high school graduates respectively. They show that the same patterns as in Panel
A continue to hold conditional on observed skill. Specifications 1 and 2 indicate that
college graduates are almost as productive in medium sized cities as they are in large cities
while the profile for high school graduates is more monotonic. In addition, we see that
the additional measures of observed skill added to the regressions in Column 2 do little to
change estimated wage premia conditional on education, providing some indication that
education level alone controls well for non-random sorting across locations. Fixed eﬀects
estimates produce remarkably similar city size wage premia for the two education groups.
The results in Table 2 exhibit several features that should invite consideration in any
analysis of the city size wage premium. First, adjustment for cost of living is crucial
for understanding workers’ decisions. Results after this adjustment indicate that using
information on workers to understand sources of the city size wage premium requires a
model with endogenous migration between at least three size categories. Second, while
controlling for observables reduces wage premia, doing so does not eliminate them. There-
fore, mechanisms additional to endogenous sorting on observables must explain observed
city size productivity premia. Tables 3 to 5 examine the relative importance of such
mechanisms.
One potential explanation for the city size wage premium is that more rapid job turnover
generates more eﬃcient firm-worker matches in larger cities. Fewer job separations into
unemployment may also generate this phenomenon. To evaluate the potential importance
of these mechanisms, the first six columns of Table 3 describe patterns of job turnover
5The next section details how we implement this cost of living adjustment.
6 In the context of a simple model of compensating diﬀerentials, the interpretation of this profile of real
wages with respect to city size is that small and large locations have higher consumer amenity values than
medium sized cities. The structural model detailed in Section 4 incorporates this idea but adds migration
frictions and life-cycle incentives to remain in larger locations, including greater returns to experience and
lower search frictions for some groups, that render the compensating diﬀerentials interpretation of this
empirical pattern incomplete.
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and unemployment by city size and education. Columns headed by "Within" indicate
transitions within MSAs or rural counties of the indicated size while those headed by
"To" indicate transitions that also involve migration to MSAs or rural counties of the
indicated size. Such "To" migration may occur between or within size categories but always
involves a change of MSA or rural county. Entries are calculated as
ÃX


!

ÃX


!
and represent estimates of the expected number of transitions or weeks of unemployment
experienced if an average individual were to spend his entire first 15 years of work experience
living in the indicated city size category. In this ratio,  is the total quantity of each
object given in Table 3 column headers for each man  in location type  over his first 
years of work experience and  is the number of years spent working in location type . To
make these results consistent with those to come, we truncate the data at 15 years of work
experience and only include those who remain in the sample that long.7 This represents
80 percent of the NLSY sample, which we describe in more detail in the next section. Our
discussion of the results in Table 3 focuses on within location transitions because migration
patterns are influenced by cost of living, amenity and option value diﬀerences across cities
in addition to job oﬀer arrival rates.
The first column of Table 3 shows that while the average number of job to job transitions
monotonically increases from 1.7 in small locations to 2.4 in large locations for college
graduates, the high school sample exhibits no clear profile. This is evidence that higher
job turnover may generate more eﬃcient matching in larger cities, but only for the more
skilled. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 indicate that the profile of job to unemployment to
job transitions is very flat in city size for college graduates and slightly increasing for the
high school sample, though selection generates a decreasing profile for the pooled sample.
However, college graduates spend less time unemployed in smaller locations while high
school graduates spend less time unemployed in larger locations. This could drive part of
the city size wage gap for the high school sample, as it is possible evidence of lower search
frictions for unemployed individuals in larger cities.
One potential alternative explanation for the city size wage premium is that more skilled
individuals disproportionately reside in (and/or migrate to) larger cities. While we are
7 is not exactly 15 for everybody because the data set does not include all of the required information
every quarter. For the purpose of Tables 3, 4 and 5 we only include individuals with a wage observation
within two years of 15 years of work experience and truncate the sample at the wage observation closest
to 15 years. For cases in which two wage observations are equidistant from 15 years, we use the longer
sample.
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forced to appeal to the structural model to fully evaluate whether sorting on unobserved
skill is important, sorting on observed skill is evident in the data. Table 3 Column 7
indicates that college graduates disproportionately enter the labor force in larger locations.
While 32 percent of total labor force entrants are in small locations, only 23 percent of
college graduates enter in small locations. In contrast, 36 percent of the high school sample
enters in small locations while just 28 percent enters in large locations. By the time they
reach 15 years of work experience, this selection only strengthens. Column 8 shows that
while there is a general tendency to migrate away from small and large locations to medium
locations over the life-cycle, this comes about because college graduates move there from
small locations and high school graduates move there from large locations.
Matrices describing location transitions between the time of labor force entry and 15
years of work experience reported in columns 9 to 11 of Table 3 present supporting evidence
of such selective migration over the life-cycle. Panel C shows that only 13 percent of high
school graduates move between cities of diﬀerent sizes during their first 15 years of work.
Those that do move out of medium and large cities are more likely to move to small cities
and rural areas than medium sized cities. Those who move out of small places are more
likely to move to medium sized cities than large cities. In contrast, Panel B shows that
college graduates are more mobile and exhibit migration patterns that are more oriented
toward larger cities. 39 percent of the college graduates entering the labor force in small
places move compared to just 12 percent of high school graduates. Of the 24 percent who
move out of medium sized cities, more than half migrate to large cities. Of the 24 percent
who migrate out of large cities, about two-thirds move to medium sized cities.8 This
evident sorting on observed skill implies that there might also be sorting on unobserved
skill. The structural model handles this possibility.
Table 4 reports the mean log wage growth associated with each type of labor market
transition examined in Table 3. Estimates give some indication as to whether returns to
experience and firm-worker match quality diﬀer across location type. To calculate these
means, we estimate Equation (3) by least squares using data diﬀerenced within individual
 for each wage observation at time period . We use the same samples as in Table
8Similar though more pronounced patterns are seen in transition matrices between residential location
at age 14 and labor force entry. Among college graduates, 33 percent change the sizes of their locations to
work their first jobs. Their mobility rate out of small locations is more than 25 percentage points higher
than out of medium and large locations. Among high school graduates, 10 percent move to take their
first jobs, with mobility rates out of all three location types within 5 percentage points of each other and
non-monotonic in city size.
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3 excluding non-wage observations and we weight by the inverse of the number of wage
observations for each individual. We index each class of labor market transition by location
type .
∆ ln() =
X

1∆ exp+2∆ exp2+3∆ exp3
+
X

(1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5) +  (3)
This equation includes a cubic in experience, indicators for the four types of job changes for
which quantities are reported in Table 3 and , which is an indicator for situations
in which a job is skipped because of lack of wage information.9 The variables  ,
 , ,  are indicators for job to job transitions within location, job to job
transitions across locations, job to unemployment to job transitions within locations and
job to unemployment to job transitions across locations respectively. We estimate this
equation separately by skill and for wages that have and have not been adjusted for cost
of living.
While the model we specify in Section 4 makes clear that the endogeneity of labor
market transitions and migration in (3) makes such a regression potentially problematic,
the results in Table 4 describe several important patterns in the wage data. First, the cost
of living adjustment hardly influences the estimates when using diﬀerenced data. Second,
returns to experience is the only element of wage growth that is strongly increasing in city
size on a positive base for both subsamples. Third, the fact that average wage growth
associated with each job to job transition is not monotonic in city size indicates that firm-
worker match quality is not a likely driver of the city size wage premium. Wage responses
to transitions through unemployment for the high school sample are increasing in city size
but with significant wage losses in small locations. Job to job transitions that involve
moving are associated with smaller wage increases in larger cities for both samples and
transitions through unemployment that also include migration are associated with larger
wage increases in larger cities, but only for college graduates. It should be noted that
because we do not typically observe wages at the very beginning of new jobs, wage growth
associated with job changes is likely to partially reflect pure experience eﬀects. Estimates
9We do not index the quadratic and cubic experience terms by location in order to ease interpretation
of the linear term coeﬃcients.
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from the structural model do not suﬀer from this limitation.10
To understand how the quantities in Table 3 and the elements of wage growth in Table
4 combine, Table 5 presents decompositions similar to those in Topel and Ward (1992) of
log wage growth by city size up to 15 years of experience into four components: within job,
between jobs with no unemployment in between, between jobs when individuals experience
an unemployment spell in between and unknown. The unknown category consists of
wage growth that occurred between jobs sandwiching a third job for which we have no
wage information. As in Table 3, each entry is expressed for the average individual if he
had spent the totality of his first 15 years of experience in the given location type and
is calculated as the ratio of total wage growth from the given component divided by the
aggregated fraction of time spent by all sampled individuals in that size location.
Results of this decomposition clearly show that within job growth is the primary driver
of the city size wage and productivity premia. For the full sample, within job growth
accounted for over 65 percent of the gaps in overall wage growth between medium and
small and between large and small cities. Job to job transitions represent the next most
important component of the medium-small gap at 34 percent, however, they are a much
less important part of the large-small wage growth gap. Instead, transitions through
unemployment account for 30 percent of the large-small city size wage growth gap overall.
Finally, note that wages at labor force entry are monotonically increasing in city size when
not accounting for cost of living diﬀerences across locations. These results indicate that
steeper returns to experience in larger locations play a central role in the city size wage gap,
but that level diﬀerences and the propensity to become unemployed may also be important.
Results for the college sample in Panel B and the high school sample in Panel C both
exhibit similar patterns, though with diﬀerent emphases. For the college sample, diﬀer-
ences in rates of within job wage growth represent over 80 percent of the gaps between wage
growth rates in small versus medium and large cities. For this group, relative wage growth
between jobs within locations also appears to be somewhat important for the medium-small
gap. In contrast, within job wage growth accounts for around 60 percent of the high school
city size wage growth premium. The most important remaining components are job to
job within locations for the medium-small gap and job-unemployment-job transitions for
10Based on a similar analysis, Wheeler (2006) concludes that wage growth from job transitions is more
steeply increasing in city size than that from within jobs. However, that result comes from an estimation
equation that does not interact experience with city size and does not account for the number of job
transitions experienced by workers relative to the amount of time they spend working.
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the large-small gap.
Consistent with other studies, the descriptive evidence in Tables 2 to 5 points to system-
atic diﬀerences in observed skill levels across locations as one important driver of city size
productivity diﬀerences. In addition, attributes of larger cities that contribute to human
capital accumulation appear important for generating higher wages in larger cities for all
groups. However, we find less consistent evidence that diﬀerences in search frictions and
matching generate much of the city size wage premium. It is hard to know the importance
of selection on unobserved skill for generating these patterns. In addition, the fact that
migration is always associated with job changes makes it diﬃcult to separate out movement
up the job ladder with level eﬀects of locations solely through examination of descriptive
data. Estimation of the model specified in Section 4 is thus invaluable as it eﬃciently uses
observations about labor force transitions to separate out parameter combinations and it
allows for identification of parameters indexed by latent ability.
3 Data
3.1 NLSY Sample and Data Construction
The primary data set used for the analysis is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) 1979 restricted use geocoded and work history files. With this data set, we
construct information on jobs, unemployment, wages and migration patterns for a sample
of young white men ages 14 to 21 on December 31st, 1978 from the time of their entry
into the labor force until 2004 or their attrition from the survey. The sample includes
1,758 men from the NLSY79 random sample of 3,003 men. We lose 20 percent of the
full sample because they entered the labor force before we observe their initial attachment.
An additional 12 percent of individuals are dropped because they were in the military at
some point, never entered the labor market, dropped out of the labor market for at least 4
contiguous years, or had significant missing job history data. The remaining individuals
excluded from the sample are nonwhites.
We sample the weekly job history data four times every year for those who become
attached to the labor force after January 1st, 1978. Sampled weeks always include the
annual interview date (which varies) and the seventh week of the three remaining quarters.
Given the number of individuals in the NLSY, quarterly sampling maximizes the number
of job and location transitions observed under the constraint that the likelihood function
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is computable in a reasonable period of time. Wages are only observed on interview dates
and in the last observation on each job.11 In Section 5 we discuss how we deal with
missing wage data econometrically. Individuals enter the sample when they begin working
full-time, providing a convenient initial condition for the likelihood function. We define
full-time as working at least 300 hours per quarter if not in school and at least 500 hours
per quarter if in school.
We assign individuals to locations based on reported state and county of residence,
which is available on interview dates and between interviews during the periods 1978-
1982 and 2000-2004 only. We assign most location observations in remaining quarters by
assuming that individuals must remain at one location for the duration of each job. We
impose that unemployed individuals must remain at the same location as the last job held.
Those jobs with multiple reported locations are assigned to the modally reported location.
Jobs with multiple modes are assigned the modal location that occurred latest in time.12
This leaves five percent of quarterly observations with no location information. Sixty
percent of these observations are for jobs sandwiched between two other jobs at the same
location. In these cases, we assume that individuals did not move. For the remaining two
percent of the sample, we impute locations to be that of the first job for which we observe
location after the unobserved location spell.
For the purpose of assigning locations into size categories, we use metropolitan area
definitions from county agglomerations specified in 1999 but assign them into size categories
based on aggregated component county populations in 1980. We select the three size
categories used throughout the paper such that the sample is split roughly into thirds.
Evidence in the previous section shows that it is important to allow potential mecha-
nisms behind the city size wage premium to diﬀer by worker skill. As such, we estimate
the model separately for those achieving high school graduation only and those with a
college education or more. In the high school sample we have 50,665 observations on 675
individuals. In the college sample, we have 42,334 observations on 586 individuals. We
observe a wage in about one-quarter of the observations.
11More precisely, up until 1993 we observe wages on up to 5 jobs per year. After 1993, we only observe
wages of the jobs most recently worked prior to interview dates, which occur about every two years.
12 In the vast majority of cases, we do not observe the location at which individuals are unemployed. The
model specified in the next section imposes that workers must remain at one location throughout each job
and that the unemployed remain at their previous work location.
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3.2 Spatial Price Index
When workers make migration decisions, they take into account relative wages and cost of
living across locations. Using wages and migration patterns to understand productivity
diﬀerences across cities thus requires accounting for such cost of living diﬀerences across
space and time. We adopt the standard approach for calculating a price index that
incorporates such a cost of living adjustment. This approach is based on a compensating
diﬀerentials framework that is the consumer analog to the firm analysis described in the
beginning of Section 2.
Equation (4) specifies the indiﬀerence relationship for workers with preferences  over
the vector of goods , some of which may diﬀer in price across locations and time periods
jointly indexed by . In order for individuals not to move, indirect utility must be equalized
everywhere at some value .
 = max
(
() + [ −
X

]
)
(4)
Log-linearizing around a mean location yields the following equilibrium relationship in
wages net of cost of living between any two locations  and 0, where  is the consumer
expenditure share on good .
ln(0) = [ln()−
X

[ln( )− ln(0 )] (5)
We use this formulation to deflate wages by cost of living diﬀerences across locations and
time periods. The resulting deflator can be expressed as follows.13
 =
Y

(0 ) (6)
Building this index requires price data by time and location for diﬀerent goods and
information on expenditure shares. We get prices by location from the American Chamber
of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) data sets from 2000 to 2002. These data
report prices in six broad expenditure categories for most metropolitan areas and some
rural counties nationwide. When possible, we take data from 2001. For the few regions
13The linear approximation for small deviations in prices across locations and periods generalizes to allow
for deviations of all sizes if utility is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas.
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not sampled in 2001 we take data from either 2000 or 2002. ACCRA reports provide us
with price data for 244 metropolitan areas and 179 rural counties.14 We impute price
data for remaining areas as follows. Metropolitan counties are assigned the average prices
from other MSAs in the same state and one of five MSA size categories when possible. If
there are none other of the same size in their state, we impute using data from MSAs of
the same size by census division. Price data for rural counties are imputed analogously.
For time series variation in prices, we use regional and metropolitan price index data
from the BLS disaggregated into the same six categories used for the ACCRA data. We
assign each county to be represented by the most geographically specific index possible in
each year. The BLS regional price indexes either apply to specific MSAs or to MSA size
within region. Together, the ACCRA and regional CPI data allow us to calculate the
relative price in each expenditure category for location/time period  relative to the base
location/time period. We define the base location/time period as the average ACCRA
location from 2001 but deflated to be index value 100 in 1999.
Rather than take expenditure shares  directly from the CPI-U, we build expenditure
shares for households including white men working full time using data from the biannual
Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CEX) starting in 1982. We build shares directly from the
CEX in order to best capture preferences of those in our sample and because the weights
used for the CPI-U sometimes fluctuate significantly from year to year. We found that
expenditure shares implied by the CEX are within a few percentage points across education
groups and city sizes. Therefore, we use a sample from the CEX that best matches our
full NLSY sample to calculate one set of expenditure weights that we apply to all studied
individuals. As with the CPI-U, we allow expenditure shares to evolve over time.
4 The Model
The model described in this section is specified to be simple enough to be tractably esti-
mated yet suﬃciently rich to capture all of the potential explanations for city size wage
gaps discussed in the introduction. We specify a "finite mixture" model, meaning that
we have a finite number of latent agent types by which some parameters of interest are
14ACCRA reports prices separately for diﬀerent counties within some large metropolitan areas. In these
cases, we allow our price index to diﬀer accordingly within MSA. Otherwise, we assign the ACCRA reported
prices to all counties in a given MSA.
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indexed.15 Our most constraining simplifying assumptions limit the number of these
underlying worker types to two and city size categories to three. Though it would be
possible to expand the number of both objects, our specification allows for simpler inter-
pretation of estimated parameters and simulations of the estimated model.16 In addition,
our specification facilitates computational tractability.
Individuals derive flow utility each period from the sum of a location-specific amenity
 , their log wage or unemployment benefit and an idiosyncratic shock. The diﬀerent
types of locations, characterized by population size categories, are denoted with subscripts
 ∈ {1 2 3}. We denote "ability" levels as  ∈ { }. These are intended to capture
underlying productivity diﬀerences between workers either from innate ability or because of
diﬀerent amounts of human capital accumulation prior to entrance into the labor market.
We allow the probability that a given worker is of type  to depend on the location in which
he enters the labor market.
Each period, each worker earns a wage which depends on his ability, labor market
experience in each location type, a firm-worker specific stochastic component and classical
measurement error. The returns to experience and the individual specific intercepts are
functions of worker type. The firm-worker specific stochastic component of the wage 
is drawn from the distribution  () from which workers sample when they receive a job
oﬀer. Because it is impossible to separately identify means of the   () distributions and
the wage process intercepts 0() we set these means to 0.17 The unexplained component
of the wage, which can be thought of as measurement error, is drawn from the location-
indexed distribution  (), is mean 0, and is independent across individuals and time.
Put together, we parameterize the wage process of an individual working in location type
 and having experience from location types indexed by  as follows:
ln ( 1 2 3  ) = +0 ()+
3X
=1
1 ()+2
Ã
3X
=1

!2
+3
Ã
3X
=1

!3
+ (7)
15Finite mixture models are widely used in the structural estimation literature. Heckman and Singer
(1984) and Keane and Wolpin (1997) are two notable examples of studies using this approach.
16Kennan & Walker (2009) and Coen-Pirani (2009) examine migration between all U.S. states. In order
to handle so many locations, they suﬃciently simplify their models such that the decompositions like those
we perform in Section 6 would not be possible.
17One could interpret the 0() parameters as capturing diﬀerences in average match quality across
location types. It is perhaps diﬃcult, however, to structurally interpret average match quality as a separate
entity from potential sharing mechanisms that influence wage level eﬀects across location types.
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After being incorporated into the full model, this specification allows us to estimate separate
time and job invariant components of worker wages and returns to experience by city size
in a more generalized environment than was possible in the reduced form treatment in
Section 2. It additionally allows for estimation of the variances of the distributions of
firm-worker specific components, which provide information on the potential importance
of matching. Indexing these three objects by latent ability allows the model to handle
sorting on unobservables.18
We denote experience at time +1 for an individual working at location  and time  by
0 =  + 1, while experience in every other location type remains constant. Individuals
accrue experience at the beginning of each working period. Note that we restrict the
curvature of the eﬀect of experience to depend only on location and not on the composition
of total labor market experience and restrict the cubic term to be the same across worker
types and locations. This sensibly reduces the dimensionality of the vector of estimated
parameters.19 We assume that each individual works for 140 quarters and then retires with
a pension equal to his last wage. After retiring, he lives for an additional 120 quarters.20
We allow the job search technology to diﬀer by city size, ability and employment status.
We denote the arrival rates of job oﬀers from the same location to be  () for unemployed
workers and  () for employed workers, where  is the worker’s location. The arrival rates
of job oﬀers from diﬀerent locations are 0 () for the unemployed and 0 () for workers,
where 0 is the location of the job oﬀer. We allow job arrival rates for the city of residence
and other cities of the same size to diﬀer. For analytical simplicity, we assume that
individuals may only receive one job oﬀer each period.21 Workers who choose to switch
jobs at the same location must pay a stochastic switching cost  with zero mean and finite
variance. This cost potentially captures diﬀerences in non-pecuniary benefits across jobs
18Based on evidence in the literature that tenure eﬀects are not large, we do not incorporate them into
the wage process. In their review of the literature, Altonji & Williams (2005) conclude that log wage
growth due to tenure eﬀects is likely only about 0.09 over the first 10 years of experience.
19We also impose the that the linear component of experience is restricted such that 1 () = 1 ().
This restriction produces more precise estimates of linear component paramters than is possible with the
fully interacted specification. Our estimates of experience eﬀects 1 () are robust to alternative specifi-
cations including 1 () = 1 ().
20 In order to reduce the computational burden, we index time to quarters for the first 60 quarters of
work after labor force entry and years for the remaining 20 years of working life. The likelihood function is
computed only using information on the first 15 years of labor force participation for each individual. More
than 75% of observations and 90% of location changes in our data happen during this period.
21 In order to limit the number of arrival rate parameters that need to be estimated, we impose the
parameter restrictions described in Appendix B.
18
that might lead workers to accept wage cuts. Exogenous separation rates () similarly
depend on location and ability. With a job oﬀer at location 0, individuals have the option
to move and pay a one-time cost of ()+ , that depends on total work experience and
has a random component with zero mean and finite variance. To keep the model simple
and because we only observe the location of unemployment in at most one week per year,
we assume that all unemployment occurs in the same location as the previous job.
We denote the value of being unemployed at location  as   and the value of holding a
job with match quality  at location  as  (). The state spaces of all value functions
that we discuss additionally include individual specific "ability"  and experience in all
location types 1 2 3. For expositional simplicity we suppress this dependence in the
notation. The current utility of an unemployed worker depends additively on the amenity
 , the unemployment benefit  () and on an  preference shock  with zero mean
and finite variance which shows up below in (8) and (9). This shock captures the random
component of the disutility of work. Given this environment, the deterministic components
of the present value of being unemployed and working are given by the following expressions
respectively:
  = 3 + ln(()) + 
1
3 
 () =  + ln () +  ()
Individuals receive their flow utility at the beginning of each period. At the end of each
period, available options and the values of shocks for the following period are revealed and
individuals make job transition and/or migration decisions accordingly. Because doing so
does not significantly aﬀect computation time, we take advantage of the high frequency of
the job history data and index time in months for the unemployed. For this reason, the
unemployed agent discounts utility by  13 and receives the amenity value 3 , whereas the
employed worker discounts by  to represent quarters and receives the amenity value  .
The expressions above are of use for clarity of exposition and notational convenience. The
key elements of interest are   and  which we specify next.
We first consider the environment for an unemployed individual at location  with less
than 35 years of work experience. At the beginning of each period, the agent observes
whether he is faced with one of five possible scenarios. With probability
³
1−  () −P30=1 0 ()´
he does not receive a job oﬀer, with probability  () he receives a job oﬀer from the same
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location, and with probability 0 () he receives an oﬀer in location type 0.22 The indi-
vidual decides at the beginning of each period whether to accept a potential job oﬀer or
remain unemployed. If he accepts an oﬀer, he pays a cost to move to the relevant new
location if necessary.
Equation (8) shows the value function for an unemployed agent in location :
  =
⎛
⎝1−  ()−
3X
0=1
0 ()
⎞
⎠ (  +  )
+ () max
£  +    ()¤ (8)
+
3X
0=1
0 ()0 max
£  +   0 ()− [() +  ]¤ 
The first term of Equation (8) represents the case in which the individual receives no job
oﬀers. In this case, he has no choice and must remain unemployed for an additional
period, receiving utility from the amenity in his location, the unemployment benefit and a
random shock. The second term gives the case in which the individual receives a job oﬀer
in his city of residence. Under this scenario, he may choose to accept the job immediately
or remain unemployed. The third term states that the unemployed agent will accept a
potential job oﬀer in another city of type 0 if the job’s option value  0 () net of the
moving cost exceeds that of remaining unemployed. The option value of having a job oﬀer
in location 0 is the discounted value of holding the job next period plus the current utility
implied by the wage oﬀer. The expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of 
in location type 0 and the distribution of the random components  and  (expressed
as 0 ).
The value function for a worker at location  resembles that for an unemployed indi-
vidual except that it also includes potential exogenous job separations and job switching
shocks. A worker in location  faces six potential scenarios: being exogenously separated
and going unemployed, not receiving a wage oﬀer, receiving an oﬀer in any of the three
types of locations and receiving a wage oﬀer in the same city. To simplify the computa-
tional intensity of the model and because this assumption has little impact on the results,
we assume that a worker decides whether to go unemployed before knowing whether he
22The parameter  () represents the probability that an unemployed individual at location  receives a
wage oﬀer in a diﬀerent city also of size category  whereas the parameter  () represents the probability
that this individual receives a wage oﬀer in the same city as his last job.
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will receive a wage oﬀer from a diﬀerent employer. As such, the value to a worker with
ability  at location  of being employed with firm match  is given by Equation (9):
 () =  ()  + (1−  ()) max{  +  
(1−  ()−
3X
0=1
0 ()) () (9)
+ ()0 max
£ ()   ¡0¢− ¤
+
3X
0=1
0 ()00 max
£ ()  0 ¡0¢−  − [() +  ]¤}
As is evident in Equation (9), an exogenously separated worker at location  may only
become unemployed in location . If the worker is not exogenously separated, he can
still choose to go unemployed if  is large enough. If he chooses to keep working, with
probability
³
1−  ()−P0 0 ()´ he does not receive a wage oﬀer. In this event, he
remains employed in the same job. If he receives an oﬀer, he either accepts it and moves
if necessary, or remains at his old job.
To conceptualize how the model works, it is convenient to define a set of reservation
functions {} that can be thought of as hypothetical firm-worker matches at which agents
would be indiﬀerent between two choices conditional on the regime in which a certain
choice set is available. We define these functions such that if a new draw for a firm-worker
match is 0  , then the agent optimally chooses to accept a job oﬀer if available or
remain employed if unemployment is the only other option. Specification of and details
on construction of these reservation functions are in Appendix A.2.
This model captures each of the components of city size wage premia discussed in the
introduction. The job arrival rate parameters for workers 0() and the distributions
of firm-worker matches  () capture job turnover and match quality. The job sepa-
ration rates (), the unemployment benefits (), the arrival rate parameters for the
unemployed 0() along with  () capture the propensity to become unemployed and
unemployment duration. The coeﬃcients on experience in Equation (7) capture diﬀer-
ences in "learning", or any agglomeration eﬀects that increases with experience. The
intercepts in the wage process capture fixed productivity diﬀerences across locations that
may be consequences of nonlabor input sharing and human capital spillovers. Each of
the key parameters is indexed by latent ability. Along with the estimated probabilities
21
that labor force entrants in each location are of low and high ability, we can thus calculate
counterfactual wage premia given diﬀerent ability distributions across location type.
5 Estimation
This section first outlines how we estimate the parameters of the model detailed in the
previous section using maximum likelihood. We then intuitively explain how parameters
of the model are identified.
5.1 The Likelihood Function
The general form for the contribution to the likelihood of an individual who enters the
labor market in location  and is observed for  periods is given by:
 () =  ¡  |; ¢+ (1− )  ¡  | ; ¢
where  is the probability that an individual is of type  given that he enters in location
 and  is the vector of parameters.23
Define  to be the vector of labor market outcomes at time  which consist of a wage,
if observed, the location of the worker and the type of labor market transition that the
worker has experienced since the previous period. We define   = {1  } as the vector
of all labor market observations in an individual’s job history up to and including period
. We decompose  ¡  |; ¢ as follows:
 ¡  |; ¢ =  (1|; ) Y
=2
 ¡| −1 ; ¢ 
It is convenient to express the likelihood function in terms of probabilities that one of
five types of event occurs. These are: finding a job in the same location if unemployed,
finding a job in a diﬀerent location if unemployed, having a job to job transition within
the same location, having a job to job transition changing location, and entering unem-
ployment. These probabilities are defined as functions of  and, if relevant, 0 but they
23The individual index is suppressed for notational simplicity.
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also depend on the other state variables { 1 2 3}:n
  ()    ()   
¡ 0¢   0 ()   0 ¡ 0¢o30=1
As an example, the transition probability between unemployment and employment at lo-
cation  with firm specific component  is as follows.
  () =  ()  ()
Z
1
¡   ( )¢  ( )
The oﬀer  at location  is received by an unemployed worker with probability  ()  ()
and is accepted only if it exceeds the reservation wage  . Appendix A.3 specifies the
remaining probabilities.
Computation of  ¡| −1¢ is complicated by the fact that we do not observe the firm
match . While it is not observed directly, we can treat it as a latent variable in a non-
Gaussian state space model. That is, we can recover the conditional density of  and
then integrate the likelihood function with respect to  given that we know the likelihood
contribution for each value of . Assuming that we know the unconditional distribution
of the firm match, we use Bayes’ rule to update the conditional distribution of  with new
wage information each period. This implies the following updating rule:
 ¡| ¢ =  ¡| −1 ¢  ¡| −1¢ (| −1) (10)
This expression is used extensively to build components of the likelihood function. Ap-
pendix A contains a complete detailed explanation of how we construct the likelihood
function.
5.2 Identification
The model we specify in the previous section is in the class generally known as finite
mixture models. This class of models features a finite number of latent agent types in the
economy and a subset of parameters that are indexed by type. By following individuals
over time, these type-specific parameters are identified, subject to standard constraints on
identification. The distribution of types is nonparametrically identified. Kasahara &
Shimotsu (2009) discusses identification of parameters in this class of models.
We cannot nonparametrically identify distributions of the firm specific wage compo-
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nents  . This is a standard limitation of structural estimation of search models that
occurs because the set of wage oﬀers generated by the left tails of the  distributions are
not accepted and therefore are not observed. As such, we are required to make assumptions
about the forms of the  () distributions. We assume that these firm-specific components
are distributed (0  ). For the purpose of implementation, the distribution of  is a
grid of ten elements which is restricted to the range (−2  4 ).
Migration plays a crucial role for the identification of many parameters of the model. If
no migration were observed, there would be no way to distinguish between the diﬀerences
in the composition of the population across locations and the inherent diﬀerences that
exist between location types. When we observe an individual who moves across location
type, the variation in labor market histories within each location type is informative about
diﬀerences across locations in parameters indexed by location. Parameters indexed by
type are identified from the full labor market histories of individuals regardless of their
location. Parameters indexed by both type and location are identified from the relative
labor market experiences across locations of workers of a given type. Identification of
these type and location specific parameters does not require that migration is exogenous,
but only that workers’ types are constant over time. We leverage the life-cycle nature of
the model to strengthen separate identification of these diﬀerent parameters.
Table A1 describes all of the estimated parameters of the model. We partition them
into six broad groups: components of the wage in Equation (7), arrival and separation
rates, amenities, benefits and costs, type probabilities, and distributional measures. We
normalize amenities to 0 in location type 0 as they would not otherwise be separately
identified from the wage shifters. The one parameter of the model that we do not estimate
is the discount factor . This is standard practice in the structural estimation of search
models. Based on estimates from the literature, Gourinchas & Parker (2002) for example,
we set the discount factor to 0.95 per year.
6 Results
6.1 Model Fit
Figures 1 and 2 show graphs of spatially deflated average log hourly wages (in cents)
from the data and those predicted by the model as functions of experience and city size.
Figure 1 shows results for college graduates while Figure 2 presents results for high school
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graduates. Figure 1 Panel A exhibits a very good fit for small locations while Panel B
shows that we have a good fit in medium sized cities up to 6 years of experience after which
the model slightly over-predicts wages. Panel C shows that for large cities we also slightly
over-predict at over 5 years of experience. Figure 2 shows that the fit for the high school
sample is generally even better than that for the college sample.
Despite overprediction in the college sample at higher levels of experience, examination
of statistics on transitions between jobs, to and from unemployment, and between locations
reveals that the simulated data match the actual data remarkably well in many dimensions.
Table 6 Panel A shows actual and predicted job, unemployment and location transitions.
The model generates simulated data that imply transition statistics that are at most 0.1
percentage points oﬀ from the actual data in both samples. Panel B shows job to job
and job to unemployment transitions within location type. Once again, neither simulated
statistic by location diﬀers from the actual data by more than 0.3 percentage points.
Panel B also shows that the simulated data match observed unemployment duration data
remarkably well.
Table 7 presents predicted and actual migration patterns conditional on changing lo-
cation. At left are location types in period  − 1 while along the top are location types
at time . Diagonal entries give the fraction of moves between diﬀerent cities of the same
location type. The largest gaps between actual and predicted in the college sample are in
transitions from large to small and small to large locations which are each under-predicted
by about two percentage points. The high school sample exhibits a similarly good fit. Its
largest actual-predicted gap is for migration from small to large locations, also at minus 2
percentage points.
6.2 The Role of Ability
Our model is designed to facilitate estimation of parameters indexed by unobserved ability.
It is natural to wonder whether unobserved ability in the model captures something beyond
what could be measured with a test score and whether a test score would be a superior
measure of ability to the one we use. We investigate this question by evaluating the
relative predictive powers of the age-adjusted Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score
available in the NLSY79 data set and our estimated ability measure for wages.
Using data on labor market history   up to each individual ’s final observation  ,
the probability that individual  is high ability is given by the following expression, which
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employs Bayes’ Rule.
Pr
¡ =  |  ¢ = Pr ¡  | = ¢× Pr ( = )Pr ¡  ¢
Each of the three elements in this expression are by-products of the same likelihood function
maximization used to estimate parameters of the model.
Table 9 presents strong evidence that our estimated ( =  |  ) is a better predic-
tor of the log wage than is the age-adjusted AFQT score. Each column in Table 9 presents
results from regressing log wages on a quadratic in experience and various combinations of
the two ability measures and two city size dummy variables. Specification (1) shows that
our ability measure has a much higher t-statistic than does AFQT (measured in standard
deviations) when predicting log wage. Indeed, the pairwise correlation between unob-
served ability and log wages is about three times greater than that between AFQT and log
wages for the college sample and twice as large for the high school sample. Specifications
(2)-(5) in Table 9 show that unobserved ability remains more informative about wages
when accounting for city size eﬀects. Coeﬃcients on city size hardly change when AFQT
is included as a control in the regressions yet increase when unobserved ability is included
as a control. Furthermore, the R-squared markedly increases when estimated ability is
included in these regressions. Low correlations between the two measures of ability of
0.16 among college graduates and 0.06 for the high school sample are consistent with these
observations.24
6.3 Wage Components
Many parameter estimates are diﬃcult to interpret in isolation because they interact non-
linearly in the model. For this reason, instead of focusing on parameters individually,
we primarily describe what groups of parameter estimates imply for patterns in wages as
functions of city size.25
Figure 3 describes the set of parameters that capture the wage process absent the
24An additional piece of evidence on the utility of our unobserved ability measure is revealed by examining
changes in sorting by ability and city size between age 14 and labor force entry. While the high school
sample exhibits little change over this period using either ability measure, the college sample exhibits
markedly stronger sorting on unobserved ability to larger locations at labor force entry than at age 14. In
contrast, the distributions of AFQT scores across locations in the college sample are very similar at these
two points in the life-cycle.
25Table A1 lists individual parameter estimates and indicates their statistical significance.
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match component and measurement error terms  and . It graphs wage profiles for low
and high ability men in each education group as functions of experience setting the match
quality  to 0 and assuming no migration over the life-cycle. These graphs are drawn using
parameters in Table A1 Category A.
The estimated level components of wages, plotted as intercepts, are similar across
locations for low and high ability college graduates. For low ability high school graduates,
however, large locations have the lowest level, followed by small then medium locations.
Among high ability high school graduates, small locations have the smallest level with
medium and large locations at the same higher level. Low ability members of the high
school sample appear to have had an unusually diﬃcult time if they entered the labor force
in a large city.
Figure 3 Panels A1 and A2 show that among college graduates, real wages become
higher in larger cities at all levels of experience above three years. Furthermore, the
returns to experience in larger cities are notably higher than in medium and small locations,
especially for high ability individuals. Figure 3 Panels B1 and B2 reveal a somewhat
diﬀerent story for high school graduates. They show that real wages in medium sized cities
are highest at all levels of experience for low ability men and most levels of experience for
high ability men. While high ability high school graduates have very similar real wages in
medium and large cities, low ability high school men earn a very constant 11 percent less in
medium sized cities and 18 percent less in small cities beyond 10 years of experience, making
nominal wages for this group almost identical in large and small locations. While returns
to experience are quite similar across locations for high ability high school graduates, low
ability types experience much steeper experience profiles in large locations during the first
10 years of experience, though it comes oﬀ of a low base.
In summary, Figure 3 indicates that the city size wage gap has both wage growth and
level components for both education groups. However, the growth component appears
more important for college graduates than high school graduates.
The other focus of this paper is to understand the role of matching for generating pro-
ductivity premia across cities of diﬀerent sizes. As with the parameters of the wage process,
it is diﬃcult to interpret the parameters that influence job turnover, job to unemployment
transitions and firm-worker match quality in isolation. Instead of attempting to interpret
them as such, Figure 4 presents graphs of the mean firm-worker match component  of the
wage process as functions of work experience, city size, education and ability given no mo-
bility across locations. To construct these graphs, we simulate data using all parameters
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reported in Table A1 except that we set the moving cost to be infinite. Therefore, the
plots in Figure 4 depict the component of wages that comes from ascension of location size
specific job ladders.
Figure 4 confirms evidence in Tables 3, 4 and 5 that search and matching are not
important components of city size wage premia. The four graphs show few consistent
relationships between the match component of wages and city size. Indeed, low ability
college graduates is the only group for which  is monotonically increasing in city size
at all levels of experience. Among high ability college graduates, average match quality
in small locations exceeds that in large and medium locations at beyond eight years of
work experience. Among high school graduates, the ordering of match quality by city size
is medium, small, large for low ability and reversed for high ability individuals. Given
that low ability individuals earn lower wages on average, that they also have the best labor
market matches in large locations serves, if anything, to reduce the city size wage premium.
The patterns in Figures 3 and 4 indicate two incentives for men of each ability level
to migrate across location type after labor force entry. Among college graduates, oppor-
tunities to improve firm-worker match quality provide incentives for low ability types to
move to larger locations at all levels of experience and high ability types to move to small
locations at high experience levels. Because relative remaining wage components across
locations graphed in Figure 3 do not counteract this force, a larger percentage of low abil-
ity than high ability college graduates choose to move to large locations over the course of
the life-cycle. A similar pattern exists for high school graduates, though the non-match
component of wages does counterbalance the match component across locations for the
low ability type. As will be evident in the following subsection, the associated change in
worker composition depresses average wages in large locations relative to small locations.
While they are not components of wages, the local amenity value and moving cost do
influence migration patterns. Our estimates indicate that medium and large cities have
higher amenity values than small locations for both education samples, keeping workers
from moving to small locations even if they receive slightly superior wage oﬀers there.26 We
estimate that moving costs are increasing in work experience and have a large stochastic
component. Our estimates indicate that about 15 percent of workers have draws from the
moving cost distribution that are less than five percent of their wage.
26Using a rich static model of compensating diﬀerentials, Albouy (2008) also finds that the amenity value
of cities is roughly increasing in city size.
28
6.4 Simulations
Using the parameter estimates from the structural model, Tables 9 and 10 evaluate the
importance of potential mechanisms for generating city size wage premia for the two sam-
ples. Because each mechanism considered is captured by multiple parameters that interact
nonlinearly with remaining parameters of the model, we achieve this by shutting oﬀ one
or two channels at a time and report implied resulting average city size wage premia. For
each experiment, we assign the average value of the relevant parameters for each latent type
listed at left in Panels B and C across locations and then regress the resulting counterfac-
tually simulated wage on a cubic in experience and two city size dummy variables. Tables
9 and 10 report the coeﬃcients on the city size dummy variables from these regressions,
all of which are statistically significant.
The ultimate goal of these simulations is to evaluate the extent to which observed wage
gaps between cities of diﬀerent sizes change under counterfactual scenarios. Performing
such an evaluation is not straightforward because the model only has predictions about
city size category of residence, not the particular city of residence within a given category.
Therefore, for the channels that generate a significant reduction in city size wage premia,
we report the associated percent reduction in nominal wages calculated incorporating the
equilibrium average price diﬀerences reported in Tables 9 and 10 Row 4. Because of the
nonlinearities in the model, these reductions do not necessarily sum to 100 percent. This
procedure is not perfect because the price diﬀerences in Row 4 are not calculated using a
counterfactual distribution of people across location within each size category. Indeed, the
key assumption for the validity of this exercise is that such equilibrium and counterfactual
distributions are the same. Nevertheless, given the magnitudes of our results we believe
that they still provide a very clear picture of the factors that generate the largest wage
gaps across locations of diﬀerent sizes.
Because wages used for estimation are adjusted for cost of living diﬀerences, the coun-
terfactual equalizing level eﬀects across locations, involving the 0 () parameters of the
wage process, requires special consideration. The goal is to generate a counterfactual by
equalizing the level component of observed wages, meaning the non-match component at 0
years of work experience, in each location. To achieve this, for the rows entitled "Equalize
Nominal Intercepts Across Locs" we equalize 0 () + ln( ), where ln( ) are given in
Row 4. We set the population weighted mean to be equal to the population weighted mean
of 0 (). There is no such issue for equalizing returns to experience because wages are
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already expressed in logs.
Table 9 reports the counterfactual simulation results for college graduates. As a base-
line, Panel A Row 1 shows that regressing log wage on a cubic in experience and two city
size dummies using the raw data implies city size wage premia of 0.14 for medium sized
cities and 0.09 for large cities.27 Data simulated from the parameter estimates in Table 10
also imply wage premia of 0.14 and 0.09 for the two size categories respectively indicating
that the model fits the data very well. Panel A Row 3 gives counterfactual city size wage
premia in the case where individuals are forced to stay in their location of labor market
entry. Commensurate with the discussion in the previous subsection, restricting mobility
actually increases wage premia between rural areas and cities to 0.17, as it forces high
ability men to stay in larger locations and keeps low ability men out of these locations.
However, this increase is only marginally statistically significant. Results in Row 2 are
used as a benchmark for counterfactuals in Panel B, for which we shut oﬀ potential chan-
nels other than mobility for the city size wage premia. Results in Row 3 benchmark results
in Panel C for which we shut oﬀ the same potential channels as in Panel B in addition to
mobility. 95 percent confidence intervals calculated by simulating the model with draws
from the joint parameter distribution in Table A1 are listed below coeﬃcients in Rows 2
and 3.
Diﬀerences in returns to experience and wage level eﬀects account for virtually the
entire city size nominal wage gap of college graduates. Absent diﬀerences in returns to
experience across locations and maintaining endogenous sorting, the counterfactual city
size nominal wage premium would be reduced by 38 percent for medium locations and 68
percent for large locations. Absent diﬀerences in wage level eﬀects, the counterfactual city
size nominal wage premium is estimated to decline by about 60 percent for both medium
and large cities.28 Search frictions plus match quality and ability sorting at entry into the
labor force have small and statistically insignificant impacts on city size wage premia and
marginal productivity premia in the college sample.29
It is perhaps more instructive to examine the importance of the same channels on wage
27These numbers diﬀer from those in Table 2 because this sample only includes observations up to 15
years of work experience and does not control for age or years of education.
28Equalizing the 0() parameters across locations without adjusting for price diﬀerences generates small
and insignificant reductions in wage premia for the college sample.
29When we break out search and matching into components involving transitions directly between jobs
and those involving transitions through unemployment, we find that both channels independently have
small impacts on city size wage premia.
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gaps without worker mobility, since doing so fully isolates the impact of each channel by
city size. Simulation results with the mobility restriction reported in Table 9 Panel C
show that mobility is not an important driver of the results in Panel B. With restricted
mobility, equalization of returns to experience across locations and types reduces nominal
wage gaps by 37 percent for medium locations and 59 percent for large locations while
level eﬀects account for 50 percent and 53 percent reductions respectively for the two size
categories. Other counterfactual changes in wage premia are small and not statistically
significant, though equalizing the ability distribution across locations at labor force entry
and restricting mobility does lead to a significant increase in the large city wage premium.
This comes about for reasons discussed in the previous subsection.
Table 10 reports analogous results to those in Table 9 for high school graduates. As with
college graduates, the estimated model generates predicted city size wage premia perfectly
in line with the data of nine percent in medium sized cities and four percent in large cities.
While diﬀerences in returns to experience and level eﬀects are also the most important
channels generating city size wage premia for the high school sample, the other two channels
that we consider counteract these two eﬀects somewhat for medium locations. Equalizing
returns to experience decreases nominal wage premia by 39 percent and 55 percent for
medium and large cities respectively with free mobility. Analogous results given restricted
mobility are more similar at 44 percent and 60 percent respectively. Equalizing level eﬀects
in the wage equation decreases city size productivity premia by more than twice as much
in medium locations with or without free mobility. In large locations, the percentage
reductions are similar to those after equalizing returns to experience. Equalization of
returns to experience across locations generate smaller reductions in log wages for the high
school sample than the college sample. However, equalization of location and ability-
specific intercepts across locations leads to similar counterfactual reductions in log wages
for the two groups.
The resulting total reductions of more than 100 percent are counteracted somewhat
because equalizing search and matching parameters or the ability distribution at labor
force entry increase wage premia, particularly in medium sized cities. Increases in the
premia due to equalization of the initial ability distribution occurs for the same reason
as in with the college sample. Counterfactual premia absent diﬀerences in search and
matching parameters also indicate that the equilibrium locations of individuals by type
result in slightly lower match qualities in medium than small locations. Inspection of
Figure 3 reveals that this must be driven by low ability types, which represent about 65
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percent of high school graduates.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we lay out a systematic framework to empirically examine reasons for which
larger cities have higher wages and are more productive. Using data from the NLSY, we
show that hourly wages are higher and grow faster in bigger cities, and that workers in
larger cities have higher observed skill levels. A decomposition of log wage growth over
the first 15 years of experience reveals that within job wage growth generates more of the
city size wage gap than between job wage growth. Estimation of a model of on-the-job
search and endogenous migration between three city size categories allows us to sort out
the extent to which sorting across locations on latent ability interacts with level eﬀects,
returns to experience, and firm-worker specific wage components to generate city size wage
gaps.
Counterfactual simulations of our structural model indicate that variation in the return
to experience and wage level eﬀects across location type are the most important mechanisms
contributing to the overall city size wage premium. These mechanisms are important for
both high school and college graduates throughout the city size distribution. Diﬀerences
in wage intercepts across location categories are more important for high school graduates,
especially in medium sized cities, while diﬀerences in returns to experience are more im-
portant for college graduates. However, sorting on unobserved ability within education
group and diﬀerences in labor market search frictions independently contribute slightly
negatively, if at all, to observed city size wage premia.
Our identification of the relative importance of these four broad channels for generating
the city size wage premium provides new information about the relevance of certain classes
of micro-founded theories over others for generating this phenomenon. We hope that our
evidence leads to further investigation of the empirical relevance of various theories that
generate wage level and growth eﬀects since these two broad mechanisms are the clear
drivers of city size wage, and likely productivity, premia.
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A Construction of the Likelihood Function
In this appendix, we present expressions for the contribution of each potential type of
event in an individual’s job history to the likelihood function. Though we suppress this
dependence in the notation, the objects (·), (·),  (·) and (·) derived below are functions
of type  and location-specific work experience {1 2 3}.
A.1 Fundamentals
Wages are not always observed when they should be. To deal with this, we define the
functions (·) and −1(·). (·) gives the distribution of wage information for the final
observations covered by each interview while the function −1(·) gives the distribution
for job changes that are reported within an interview cycle. As mentioned in the data
section, wages are observed once a year for up to five diﬀerent jobs. Therefore if a worker
does not change employer, we have only one wage observation a year for that worker, while
if a worker changes employer within a cycle, we may have more than one wage observation.
Because the wage is recorded in  − 1 only because the worker has changed jobs in the
previous period, this information must be included in the contribution to the likelihood
function of period  using the function −1(·). These functions include the parameter
, the probability of observing a wage.
 () =
h
[ ()]1( ) [1− ]1(  )
i1( 6=+1)
−1 () =
h
[ (−1)]1(−1 ) [1− ]1(−1  )
i1(−1= & −1 6=)
Because we have no interest in the value of  and we take it as exogenous, we can simplify
the expressions above by conditioning the likelihood on observing the wages. Therefore,
we define these functions to be
 () =  ()1(  &  6=+1)
−1 () =  (−1)1(−1  & −1= & −1 6=)
instead.
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A.2 Reservation Rules
Regime A occurs when an unemployed agent receives an own-location job oﬀer. Regime
B occurs when a worker is choosing whether to go unemployed. Regime C occurs when
an unemployed agent receives an oﬀer in another location. Regime D occurs when a
worker receives an own-location oﬀer. Regime E occurs when a worker receives an oﬀer
in another location. In cases where a new match is drawn and the worker has an existing
match quality, 0 denotes the new match and  denotes the firm-specific component of the
existing job. If the worker is unemployed,  denotes the new match draw.
 ( ) solves :   +  =  () 
 (  ) solves :   +  = (1−  ()−
3X
=1
0 ()) () +
+ ()0 max
£ ()   ¡0¢− ¤+
+
3X
0=1
0 ()00 max
£ ()  0 ¡0¢−  − [ +  ]¤
0 (  ) solves :   +  = 0 ()−  −  
 ( ) solves :   () = 
¡0¢−  
0 (   ) solves :   () = 0
¡0¢−  −  − 
A.3 Transition Probabilities
The probability of exiting unemployment and finding a job with match  in the same
location  is given by:
  () =  ()  ()
Z
1
¡   ( )¢  ( )
The probability of exiting unemployment and finding a job with match  in a diﬀerent
location 0 is:
 0 () = 0 () 0 ()
Z Z
1
¡  0 (  )¢  ( ) ()
The probability of entering unemployment given that a worker had a job with match 
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is:
  () = () + (1− ())
Z
1
¡   ( )¢  ( )
The probability of changing employer from match  to match 0 in the same location
is:
 
¡ 0¢ = £1−   ()¤×  ()  (0)
×
Z
1
¡0   ( )¢  ()
The probability of changing employer from match  in location  to match 0 in location
0 is:
 0
¡ 0¢ = £1−   ()¤× 0 () 0 (0)
×
Z Z
1
¡0  0 (  )¢  () ()
A.4 First Period
Because we condition on working in the first period, the contribution to the likelihood of
an individual entering in location  is:
1 =
R 1 ()  () R   () 
The resulting posterior distribution of the firm match is:
 ¡| 1¢ = 1 ()  ()R 1 ()  () 
A.5 Unemployment
An individual of ability  enters unemployment in location  and has an unemployment
spell that lasts  weeks. The probability of not accepting a job for  − 1 weeks is
given by
Π2 () =
⎛
⎝1−
Z
  () −
3X
=1
Z
 0 () 
⎞
⎠
−1
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After  weeks, the worker finds a job in location  or in location 0. If he finds a job in
location , the total contribution of this unemployment spell to the likelihood function is:
2 = Π2 ()
Z
 ()  () 
The posterior distribution of the match then becomes:
 ¡| ¢ =  ()  ()R  ()  () 
If after  weeks he finds a job in location 0, the contribution of the unemployment
spell to the likelihood function is:
2 = Π2 ()
Z
0 () 0 () 
The posterior distribution of the match is then:
 ¡| ¢ = 0 () 0 ()R 0 () 0 () 
A.6 Becoming Unemployed
A worker in location  goes unemployed with probability   () and the density of the
observed wage is −1 (). From the previous period we know  ¡| −1¢. Given this, we
can express the contribution of becoming employed to the likelihood as:
3 =
Z
−1 ()  () 
¡| −1¢
Given that the firm specific component  is lost, we do not need to update its conditional
distribution.
36
A.7 Working
If the worker remains with the same employer, the likelihood contribution and the condi-
tional distribution of the firm match after this period can be written as:
4 =
Z
 ()
⎛
⎝1−   ()−
Z
 
¡ 0¢ 0 − 3X
=1
Z
 0
¡ 0¢ 0
⎞
⎠  ¡| −1¢
 ¡| ¢ =  ()
³
1−   ()− R   ( 0) 0 −P3=1 R  0 ( 0) 0´  ¡| −1¢
4
Alternately, the employed worker may move to a diﬀerent employer in the same type
of location.
4 =
Z Z
−1 () ¡0¢  ¡ 0¢  ¡| −1¢ 0
 ¡0| ¢ =  (0) R −1 ()  ( 0)  ¡| −1¢4
Note that the inclusion of the function −1() captures the fact that in  − 1 we have
observed a wage only because the worker has changed jobs in period . Hence this wage
information is included in period  and not in period − 1.
Finally, the employed worker may move to a diﬀerent employer in a diﬀerent type of
location.
4 =
Z Z
−1 ()0 ¡0¢ 0 ¡ 0¢  ¡| −1¢ 0
 ¡0|  ¢ = 0 (0) R −1 () 0 ( 0)  ¡| −1¢4
B Normalizations of Job Oﬀer Arrival Rates
In the model there are 48 free parameters that measure arrival rates of job oﬀers of which
36 are probabilities of receiving a wage oﬀer from a diﬀerent location. Given that changing
location is a rare event in the data, these parameters cannot be estimated precisely. Instead
we estimate freely the 12 parameters that describe the probability of receiving a wage oﬀer
from the same location and we assume that the remaining probabilities are scaled by the
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4 estimated parameters 0 and . We define 0 to be a multiplier for arrival rates to a
given city 0 and  to be a parameter that scales the product ()0 if the two location
sizes are the same but the individual changes location. We use the same scaling factors
for unemployed and worker arrival rates. Arrival rates of job oﬀers across locations are
thus specified as follows.
0() =  ()0 if  6= 0
0() =  ()0 if  = 0
0() = ()0 if  6= 0
0() = ()0 if  = 0
These normalizations reduce the number of arrival rate parameters to be estimated from
48 to 16.
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1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
MSAs 0.25 - 1.5 million 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MSAs > 1.5 million 0.24*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.22***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.34 0.29
Spec. 1: No Controls Spec. 2: Individual Controls
Table 1: Estimates of City Size Wage Premia from Census Micro Data
Notes: The sample includes white men 20-64 working at least 40 weeks and at least 35 hours per week from
the 5% census micro data samples. Wages of less than $1 or more than $300 (1999 dollars) are excluded from
the sample. Main entries are coefficients and standard errors from regressions of log hourly wage on indicators
for metropolitan area size of residence. Individual controls are age, age squared and indicators for nine levels
of education. Standard errors are clustered by county group or PUMA. Sample sizes are 1,269,114 in 1980,
1,330,116 in 1990 and 1,245,865 in 2000.
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Specification 1 2 3 1 2 3
Medium 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.06***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Large 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.06** 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
R-squared 0.04 0.30 0.61 0.01 0.29 0.60
Medium 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.08*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.06*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Large 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
R-squared 0.03 0.26 0.61 0.01 0.27 0.61
Medium 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Large 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
R-squared 0.03 0.18 0.54 0.01 0.19 0.53
Panel C: High School Graduates Only
Notes: Each regression in Panel A uses data on 1,754 white men and has 30,367 observations based on quarterly
data. Panel B has 8,899 observations on 583 individuals. Panel C has 12,646 observations on 674 individuals.
Individual controls are years of education and quadratics in age and experience. Standard errors are clustered by
location.  Complete sample selection rules are explained in the text.
Table 2: Estimates of City Size Wage Premia from NLSY Data
Temporally Deflated Only Spatially and Temporally Deflated
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: College or More
No Controls Individual   Controls
Individual 
Controls and 
Fixed Effects
No Controls Individual   Controls
Individual 
Controls and 
Fixed Effects
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Within To Within Length To Length At Entry At 15 Yrs To S To M To L
Location 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Small 2.7 0.7 1.8 22.9 0.4 4.7 0.32 0.30 0.78 0.15 0.07
Medium 3.0 0.6 1.7 19.1 0.3 3.4 0.36 0.39 0.10 0.83 0.08
Large 3.0 0.4 1.6 16.0 0.3 2.2 0.32 0.30 0.08 0.13 0.79
Small 1.7 0.9 0.7 6.0 0.4 2.3 0.23 0.21 0.61 0.26 0.13
Medium 2.2 0.7 0.8 6.2 0.3 3.4 0.40 0.42 0.10 0.76 0.14
Large 2.4 0.6 0.7 7.2 0.3 2.1 0.37 0.37 0.09 0.15 0.76
Small 3.1 0.6 2.1 31.2 0.4 4.6 0.36 0.37 0.88 0.08 0.04
Medium 3.3 0.4 2.2 27.1 0.3 3.0 0.36 0.37 0.10 0.88 0.01
Large 3.0 0.3 2.3 26.7 0.2 2.4 0.28 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.84
Job-Unemployment-Job Changes Migration Since LF EntryJob-Job Changes
Table 3: Attributes at 15 Years of Work Experience as a Function of Location
Notes: The sample includes all individuals used for the regressions in Table 2 except those who we do not observe for at least 15
years of work experience. Columns marked "Within" report numbers for job changes within location whereas columns marked "To"
report job changes across locations to locations of the indicated size. Each entry is calculated as the total amount of the quantity
indicated in the column header for the sample indicated in the panel header divided by the sum of the fraction of time spent by
everybody in the sample in the location category given in the row header. Therefore, each entry is the amount of each quantity
experienced by the average individual over the first 15 years of work experience if he were to live in the indicated location for the full
time. "Length" refers to total length of all unemployment spells. "LF" stands for labor force. The full sample includes 1,425 men,
including 466 in the college sample and 566 in the high school sample.
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: College or More
Panel C: High School Graduates Only
Frac. in Location
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All College HS All College HS
∆Experience 0.031** 0.046** 0.016 0.031** 0.046** 0.017
in Small (0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.012) (0.019) (0.023)
∆Experience 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.046*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.045***
in Medium (0.010) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.013)
∆Experience 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.054***
in Large (0.011) (0.023) (0.012) (0.010) (0.022) (0.012)
∆Exp2 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
∆Exp3 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Job to Job 0.066*** 0.081* 0.078*** 0.066*** 0.082* 0.079***
in Small (0.018) (0.043) (0.028) (0.018) (0.043) (0.028)
Job to Job 0.097*** 0.126*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.126*** 0.093***
in Medium (0.010) (0.024) (0.016) (0.010) (0.024) (0.016)
Job to Job 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.085*** 0.077***
in Large (0.012) (0.022) (0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.015)
Job-Un-Job -0.017 0.043 -0.050** -0.015 0.043 -0.047*
in Small (0.017) (0.092) (0.025) (0.017) (0.092) (0.025)
Job-Un-Job -0.027 -0.022 -0.028 -0.028 -0.022 -0.029
in Medium (0.019) (0.047) (0.026) (0.019) (0.046) (0.026)
Job-Un-Job 0.021 0.026 0.025 0.021 0.028 0.023
in Large (0.015) (0.054) (0.020) (0.015) (0.054) (0.019)
Job-Job+Move 0.099*** 0.212*** 0.032 0.126*** 0.245*** 0.053
to Small (0.032) (0.055) (0.057) (0.032) (0.057) (0.058)
Job-Job+Move 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.019 0.133*** 0.144*** 0.027
to Medium (0.036) (0.044) (0.058) (0.032) (0.043) (0.058)
Job-Job+Move 0.085** 0.113*** -0.134 0.055* 0.107*** -0.204**
to Large (0.034) (0.041) (0.101) (0.032) (0.040) (0.100)
Job-Un-Job + -0.033 -0.013 0.000 0.004 0.019 0.029
Move to Small (0.042) (0.101) (0.058) (0.041) (0.100) (0.057)
Job-Un-Job + -0.072* -0.007 -0.089 -0.028 0.028 -0.025
Move to Medium (0.044) (0.095) (0.063) (0.044) (0.091) (0.062)
Job-Un-Job + 0.161*** 0.184** 0.234*** 0.109* 0.143** 0.158*
Move to Large (0.055) (0.074) (0.071) (0.058) (0.060) (0.087)
Unobs. Job -0.105*** -0.180** -0.140** -0.100** -0.163** -0.142**
to Small (0.038) (0.082) (0.068) (0.040) (0.081) (0.069)
Unobs. Job -0.086 -0.035 -0.164* -0.085 -0.052 -0.152*
to Medium (0.074) (0.197) (0.087) (0.073) (0.191) (0.086)
Unobs. Job -0.077 -0.014 -0.107 -0.085 -0.038 -0.093
to Large (0.080) (0.186) (0.099) (0.081) (0.186) (0.100)
Observations 21481 6276 9020 21481 6276 9020
R-squared 0.019 0.028 0.020 0.020 0.030 0.020
Table 4: ∆Log Wage Regressions
Temporally Deflated Only Spatially and Temporally Deflated
Notes: Each column is a separate regression of the change in log wage on functions of experience or labor
market transitions listed at left. The regression specification is given by Equation (3) in the text. The 185 cases
of gaps between wage observations exceeding 10 quarters are excluded.
44
Within Un- Total
COL Adj. Unadjusted Job Within Between Within Between Known Growth
Small 2.09 2.04 0.28 0.18 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.47
Medium 2.13 2.12 0.44 0.25 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.67
     Frac of Diff With Small 0.74 0.34 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.01
Large 2.02 2.13 0.51 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.80
     Frac of Diff With Small 0.66 0.11 -0.06 0.14 0.16 0.00
Small 2.27 2.22 0.39 0.11 0.19 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.65
Medium 2.26 2.24 0.56 0.25 0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.87
     Frac of Diff With Small 0.81 0.64 -0.49 -0.11 0.11 0.05
Large 2.24 2.34 0.61 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.91
     Frac of Diff With Small 0.83 0.34 -0.47 0.01 0.22 0.07
Small 2.00 1.96 0.27 0.24 0.02 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.42
Medium 2.04 2.01 0.34 0.28 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.53
     Frac of Diff With Small 0.67 0.38 -0.02 0.13 -0.20 0.05
Large 1.88 1.99 0.44 0.22 -0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.70
     Frac of Diff With Small 0.59 -0.10 -0.16 0.43 0.18 0.06
Table 5: Log Wage Growth Decomposition
0 to 15 Years of Work Experience
Notes: Reported numbers decompose average temporally deflated wage growth by location from 0 to 15 years of experience. As in
Table 3, each entry is expressed for the average individual as if he were to spend the totality of his first 15 years of experience in the
given location type. The unknown component of wage growth comes from jobs for which we do not observe a wage. Analogous
elements of cost of living adjusted wage growth are very similar to those reported in this table. "COL Adjusted" in the first column
refers to wages at labor force entry that have been spatially and temporally deflated. "Unadjusted" in the second column refers to
wages that have only been temporally deflated.
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: College or More
Panel C: High School Graduates Only
Wage at LF Entry Job to Job Job to Unemp. to Job
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Mobility Rates Data Model Data Model
Job Changes 7.1% 7.1% 11.0% 11.0%
Job to Job Transitions 5.2% 5.1% 6.3% 6.2%
Job to Unemployment Transitions 1.9% 2.0% 4.7% 4.8%
Location Changes 1.8% 1.8% 1.4% 1.4%
Job to Job in Small 4.1% 4.0% 5.9% 5.8%
Job to Job in Medium 4.5% 4.3% 6.1% 5.8%
Job to Job in Large 4.8% 4.8% 5.6% 5.6%
Job to Unemployment in Small 1.6% 1.7% 4.4% 4.6%
Job to Unemployment in Medium 1.7% 1.8% 4.3% 4.4%
Job to Unemployment in Large 1.5% 1.6% 4.4% 4.6%
Unemployment Duration in Small 5.6 5.7 5.9 5.8
Unemployment Duration in Medium 4.6 4.7 5.5 5.5
Unemployment Duration in Large 6.1 5.9 5.0 5.0
Table 6: Actual and Predicted Mobility Rates
College Sample High School Sample
Notes: Each entry above the bottom three rows gives the percent of observations exhibiting the
indicated transition in actual data and data simulated using estimated parameters reported in
Table A1. The numbers in panel B are calculated using only transitions that did not involve a
change of location The final three rows show averages of actual and simulated data across
unemployment spells whose lengths are measured in weeks.
Panel A: Transition Rates
Panel B: Transition Rates by Location
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Period t-1
Location Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Small 13.0% 10.0% 5.4% 11.6% 9.7% 7.2%
Medium 10.7% 16.7% 13.2% 10.6% 18.1% 11.7%
Large 5.6% 12.9% 12.5% 8.0% 10.6% 12.6%
Small 26.2% 14.1% 6.9% 25.7% 12.4% 8.9%
Medium 13.3% 12.1% 9.3% 13.7% 13.6% 7.5%
Large 6.3% 6.1% 5.9% 7.4% 5.7% 5.0%
Notes: Each entry gives the percent of individuals who change locations that move from the
location type listed at left to the location type listed at top. The left half of the table reports these
numbers from the data and the right half of the table reports these numbers from data simulated
using the parameter estimates reported in Table A1.
Table 7: Actual and Predicted Migration Conditional on Moving
Period t Location: Data Period t Location: Model
Panel B: High School Sample
Panel A: College Sample
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Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medium 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Large 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.23
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
AFQT 0.04 0.07 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pr(h=hH) 0.60 0.65 0.64
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R-Squared 0.41 0.24 0.25 0.43 0.43
Medium 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.15
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Large 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AFQT 0.05 0.06 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pr(h=hH) 0.21 0.31 0.30
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R-Squared 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.24
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient or standard error from a regression of log wage on the
variables listed at left, experience and experience squared. Each regression uses all
available wage observations from those for whom an AFQT score is observed.
Regressions have 8,673 observations in Panel A and 12,215 observations in Panel B.
AFQT is not observed for all individuals and is measured in standard deviation units with
standard deviations calculated separately for each sample. Pr(h=hH) is the estimated
probability that each individual in the data set is high type calculated as explained in the
text.
Table 8: Log Wages and AFQT Versus Unobserved Ability
Panel A: College Sample
Panel B: High School Sample
log wage
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Experiment Medium Large Medium Large
1. Baseline Data 0.14 0.09
2. Model 0.14 0.09
[0.07, 0.22] [0.02, 0.17]
3. Restricted Mobility (Compare to Row 2) 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.08
[0.09, 0.27] [0.08, 0.26]
4. Price Differential 0.06 0.18
Equalize Ability Distribution at LF Entry 0.13 0.14 -0.01 0.05
Equalize Search & Matching Across Locations 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.05
Equalize Return to Experience Across Locs 0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.18
  Implied Reduction in Marginal Productivity Gap 38% 68%
Equalize Nominal Intercepts Across Locs 0.02 -0.07 -0.11 -0.16
  Implied Reduction in Marginal Productivity Gap 58% 60%
Equalize Ability Distribution at LF Entry 0.15 0.24 -0.02 0.07
Equalize Search & Matching Across Locations 0.19 0.16 0.02 -0.02
Equalize Returns to Experience Across Locs 0.08 -0.03 -0.09 -0.21
  Implied Reduction in Marginal Productivity Gap 37% 59%
Equalize Nominal Intercepts Across Locs 0.05 -0.01 -0.12 -0.19
  Implied Reduction in Marginal Productivity Gap 50% 53%
Panel B: Counterfactuals With Free Mobility (Row 2 Reference)
Panel C: Counterfactuals With Restricted Mobility (Row 3 Reference)
Notes: Panel A Row 1 presents average wage premia from the raw data, Row 2 shows premia based on
simulated data and Row 3 is based on simulated data for which mobility cost is infinite. Other estimates are
based on simulated data using parameter values achieving the listed scenario. For ability distribution
equalization, we set probabilities of labor force entry by type across locations equal to their weighted average
across locations. For search friction equalization, we set all arrival and separation rates equal to their weighted
averages across locations, where the weights are based on composition by type across locations at labor force
entry. Equalization of returns to experience across locations is achieved analogously. Imposing all restrictions
in Panel C simultaneously generates simulated wage premia of 0 in both location types.
Equalization of nominal intercepts across locations is achieved by setting intercepts from the wage process to
differ by the average price differences across location type given in Row 4 and renormalized such that the
weighted average equals the weighted average of real intercept terms reported in Table A1. Bolded entries
indicate that counterfactual estimates lie outside the indicated 95% confidence interval for the reference. Italics
indicate lying outside the 90% confidence interval instead.
Table 9: Counterfactual City Size Wage Premia
College Sample
Regression Coefficients Gap With Reference
Panel A: Premia for Comparison
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Experiment Medium Large Medium Large
1. Baseline Data 0.09 0.04
2. Model 0.09 0.04
[0.06, 0.13] [0.00, 0.08]
3. Restricted Mobility (Compare to Row 2) 0.10 0.03 0.01 -0.01
[0.06, 0.15] [-0.02, 0.07]
4. Price Differential 0.03 0.19
Equalize Ability Distribution at LF Entry 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.01
Equalize Search & Matching Across Locations 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.04
Equalize Returns to Experience Across Locs 0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.13
  Implied Reduction in Marginal Productivity Gap 39% 55%
Equalize Nominal Intercepts Across Locs -0.05 -0.09 -0.14 -0.14
  Implied Reduction in Marginal Productivity Gap 118% 59%
Equalize Ability Distribution at LF Entry 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.02
Equalize Search & Matching Across Locations 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.02
Equalize Returns to Experience Across Locs 0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.13
  Implied Reduction in Marginal Productivity Gap 44% 60%
Equalize Nominal Intercepts Across Locs -0.04 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14
  Implied Reduction in Marginal Productivity Gap 111% 63%
Panel B: Counterfactuals With Free Mobility (Row 2 Reference)
Panel C: Counterfactuals With Restricted Mobility (Row 3 Reference)
Notes: See the notes to Table 9 for a detailed description of the table.
Table 10: Counterfactual City Size Wage Premia
High School Sample
Regression Coefficients Gap With Fitted Values
Panel A: Premia for Comparison
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Parameter Description Low Type High Type Low Type High Type
A. Components of Wages
0
1 Wage Constant for Living in Small Locations 6.66*** 7.02*** 6.41*** 6.62***
0
2 Wage Constant for Living in Medium Locations 6.70*** 7.11*** 6.52*** 6.71***
0
3 Wage Constant for Living in Large Locations 6.66*** 7.04*** 6.26*** 6.70***
1
1 Return to Experience from Work in Small 0.052*** 0.087*** 0.061*** 0.054***
1
2 Return to Experience from Work in Medium 0.058*** 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.071***
1
3 Return to Experience from Work in Large 0.069*** 0.100*** 0.062*** 0.051***
 Multiplier for Living in Medium Locations
 Multiplier for Living in Large Locations
2 Coefficient On Experience Squared in Small Locations
 Multilier for Medium Locations: 

 Multiplier for Large Locations: 

3 Coefficient On Experience Cubed
B. Arrival and Separation Rates
 Job Offer Arrival Rate Within Small Locations 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.22***
 Job Offer Arrival Rate Within Medium Locations 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.26***
 Job Offer Arrival Rate Within Large Locations 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.24***
u1 Job Offer Arrival Rate Within Small from Unemployed 0.14*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.18***
u2 Job Offer Arrival Rate Within Medium from Unemployed 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.17***
u3 Job Offer Arrival Rate Within Large from Unemployed 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.18*** 0.21***
 Receive Rate in Small: 21=12 and 
u
21=1
u
2
 Receive Rate in Medium
 Receive Rate in Large
 Own Location Type Multiplier: 11=11 and 
u
11=
u
11
1 Separation Rate in Small 0.003 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.009***
2 Separation Rate in Medium 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.030***
3 Separation Rate in Large 0.004*** 0.016*** 0.002 0.006***
C. Amenities
2 Amenity of Medium Locations
 Amenity of Large Locations
D. Benefits and Costs
ln(b1) Unemployment benefit in Small -0.73*** 0.01 0.34*** 0.89***
ln(b2) Unemployment benefit in Medium -1.36*** -0.95*** 0.39*** 0.76***
ln(b3) Unemployment benefit in Large -0.39*** -1.25*** 0.31*** 0.73***
C Moving Cost - Constant
C Moving Cost - Linear term
C Moving Cost - Quadratic Term
E. Heterogeneity
1 Probability of Type Given Start in Small Location 0.54*** 0.46*** 0.53*** 0.47***
2 Probability of Type Given Start in Medium Location 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.71*** 0.29***
3 Probability of Type Given Start in Large Location 0.66*** 0.34*** 0.65*** 0.35***
F. Distributions
1 Standard Deviation of Match in Small 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.38***
2 Standard Deviation of Match in Medium 0.39*** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.50***
3 Standard Deviation of Match in Large 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.31***
U Standard Deviation of Utility Shock for Unemployed
S Standard Deviation of Job Switching Cost Shock
M Standard Deviation of Moving Cost Shock
u1 Standard Deviation of Wage Measurement Error - Small
u2 Standard Deviation of Wage Measurement Error - Medium
u3 Standard Deviation of Wage Measurement Error- Large
0.20*** 0.06***
0.39*** 0.20***
1.34***
0.09***
0.05***
0.29***
0.18***
2.31***
Table A1: Parameter Estimates from the Structural Model
College Sample High School Sample
-0.0056***
1.36*** 0.96***
1.35*** 1.58***
-0.0054***
0.00024*** 0.00020***
1.05***
1.27***
8.82*** 6.76***
14.42*** 7.43***
0.95*** 3.99***
0.04*** -0.20***
1.16***
1.21***
0.18*** 0.06***
8.58*** 3.63***
22.05*** 23.94***
0.30*** 0.27***
0.29*** 0.22***
0.29*** 0.28***
Notes: This table shows the universe of estimated model parameters. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5%
level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.  The discount rate is calibrated to 0.95.
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Figure 1: Actual and Predicted Wages by Experience: College Sample
Panel A: Small Locations
Panel B: Medium Locations
Panel C: Large Locations
Notes: Each plot shows mean actual and predicted wages by work experience. Means are
calculated separately within each year of work experience. Actual mean wages are drawn in
red and mean wages based on model simulations are drawn in blue. Table A1 lists the
parameter values used for simulations.
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Figure 2: Actual and Predicted Wages by Experience: High School Sample
Panel A: Small Locations
Panel B: Medium Locations
Panel C: Large Locations
Notes: See the notes to Figure 1 for a description of the plots.
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Figure 3: Experience Profiles Implied by Parameter Estimates
Notes: Each panel graphs real wages excluding the firm-worker match and measurement error components as functions of years of experience by location type,
education and ability. These are plots of Equation (7) in the text but restricting ε and u to 0 and assuming no mobility across locations. The parameters used to graph
these functions are found in Table A1.
Panel A1: College Graduates, Low Ability Panel A2: College Graduates, High Ability
Panel B1: High School Graduates, Low Ability Panel B2: High School Graduates, High Ability
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Figure 4: Firm-Worker Match Component of the Wage
Notes: Each panel graphs the mean of the match component ε of the real wage assuming no mobility across locations. Data for the plots are constructed by
simulating the model using parameters in Table A1 except that the mobility costs are set to be infinite.
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